Last week at Foreign Policy’s “Shadow Government” blog, AEI’s Dan Blumenthal illustrated just how dramatically the United States’ ability to project power in Asia has waned in the last 15 years:

Today the balance of power in Asia is shifting. Since the end of World War II, Washington has kept the peace in Asia through its forward presence of military forces and its uncontested ability to project force into the region. Take an example from just 14 years ago. Realizing how destabilizing were China’s missile tests conducted in the waters around Taiwan, President Clinton sent carrier battle groups near the Taiwan Strait. The missile tests stopped, Taiwan held its elections, and conflict was avoided.

Today, any president would think twice about doing the same. Why? China has arguably gained conventional supremacy around its periphery. Without remediation this could become a hard fact. China’s growing short-range missile arsenal (maybe up to 1,500) and fleet of modern aircraft could not only be used to destroy much of Taiwan, but could also be used to strike devastating blows against U.S. forces in Japan. Together with its fast-growing submarine fleet, the Chinese missile force will, within the next decade, be able to cause serious harm to U.S. carriers steaming into the region.

Beijing has been focused like a laser beam on how to coerce and intimidate Taiwan while deterring U.S. and Japanese intervention. Washington has not given the same attention to defense. Our shipbuilding program has atrophied, our ability to protect the bases from which our aircraft fly is non-existent, and there is nothing in the current navy or air force programs of record that demonstrate our attentiveness to this problem.

For more on how the United States has taken its eye off the ball in Asia, read the full post here.

(Photo: flickr/U.S. Navy photo by Cmdr. Ed Thompson, commanding officer USS Harpers Ferry, LSD 49)

In an article at AOLNews.com today, CDS director Tom Donnelly offers his thoughts on last night’s Oval Office address:

President Barack Obama’s elegy for Operation Iraqi Freedom Tuesday night quoted a staff sergeant from the 2nd Infantry Division’s 4th Stryker Brigade, the last U.S. Army “combat” unit to cross into Kuwait: “I know that to my brothers in arms who fought and died, this would probably mean a lot.”

The staff sergeant was Luke Dill, and his words were published in an Aug. 19 Associated Press story. But Dill, an 18-year-old specialist in 2003, made it in a far different spirit than his commander in chief. “It’s something I’m going to be proud of for the rest of my life — the fact that I came in on the initial push, and now I’m leaving with the last of the combat units” is the rest of what he said.

As the president noted, Dill and those he fought with left a lot behind in Iraq. But they left not just what they lost but what they won. And still more important, and as the full quote makes plain, Dill takes much away, beginning with his pride in — yes — a mission accomplished.

Yet the larger American mission in Iraq is not complete or fully accomplished. About this, too, the president was muted and imprecise. He spoke of a long-term partnership with Iraq — a deeply vital strategic interest for the U.S. — yet reaffirmed his intention to withdraw all American troops over the next year. Obama remains hesitant, reluctant to commit, ambiguous, anxious to “turn the page.”

Read the rest here.

(Photo: flickr/The White House)

Yesterday, I moderated a discussion with my AEI colleagues Tom Donnelly, Fred Kagan, and Michael Rubin, held in anticipation of today’s formal conclusion of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq.  A central point to emerge from the briefing was that the United States has entered a new, but no less challenging, period in its relationship with Iraq—one which will demand serious, continued U.S. engagement, so as to guard and build upon the fragile success we and our Iraqi partners have achieved thus far. In the coming year, Iraqi leaders will be watching closely to determine whether the United States intends to remain a long-term committed partner. In his remarks on Iraq this evening, one hopes that President Obama will convey just that.

Audio of yesterday’s discussion is available here; a full transcript will be available shortly.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Andy Dunaway)

Ironically, even new military technologies intended to prevent casualties in the event of war have raised similar dilemmas.  “Non-lethal” weapons that employ directed energy are a case in point.

The Active Denial System (ADS)—a novel millimeter-wave technology useful for deterring approaching individuals and protecting American forces without jeopardizing innocent lives—has been redeployed from Afghanistan because of concerns about how its use against Afghans might be perceived.  Moreover, some military leaders within USCENTCOM seem unwilling or unable to counter the anticipated criticisms that America’s enemies, inaccurate news accounts, or the blogosphere would hurl against us in the event of the weapon’s use.

ADS uses an invisible beam of directed energy to cause an intense heating sensation on the surface of the skin that forces the target to move quickly in order to get out of its path.  It is effective at dispersing unruly and potentially dangerous individuals without any lasting physical effects; once the subject moves out of the beam’s path, the sensation disappears.  It has been demonstrated to be safe in more than 11,000 tests on 700 human volunteers, including members of the media.  Importantly, ADS fits nicely into a war strategy that seeks to maximize the protection of American forces while minimizing unintended non-combatant casualties.

According to press reports, ADS—which only recently arrived in Afghanistan – has now been shipped back to the United States without ever firing an electron in anger or self-defense.  But why send a sophisticated weapon system all to way to a theater of war only to pack it up and send it home soon after it arrives without ever employing it?  With July being the deadliest month for American troops since the Afghan conflict began more than eight years ago, it isn’t due to significant improvements in the Afghan security situation.

Rather, it appears ADS is the victim of a major perception problem.  It is easily mischaracterized as a weapon that “fries” or “cooks” its targets.   One commentator called it a “riot-roasting raygun.”  In fact, details on how the weapon works and the associated human effects have been openly published.  Nevertheless, misinformation persists.

Yet the non-lethality of the ADS system could prove useful in a counterinsurgency operation where avoidance of civilian casualties is essential to mission success.  Indeed, the recently revised “Tactical Directive” governing the use of force in Afghanistan by U.S. troops—originally promulgated by former U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Commander General Stanley McChrystal and now reaffirmed in slightly modified form by General David Petraeus— virtually cries out for greater employment of non-lethal technologies.

In an unclassified portion of the directive it states:

“We must continue—indeed, redouble—our efforts to reduce the loss of innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum.  Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause. If we use excessive force or operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.” (emphasis in original)

Importantly, the directive calls the protection of Afghan civilians a “moral imperative” and highlights the need to “bring all assets to bear” to protect American and Afghan troops.  Non-lethal weapons, including the Active Denial System, are designed to do just that.

In the Tactical Directive, General Petraeus notes, “Some civilian casualties result from a misunderstanding or ignorance of local customs and behaviors.  No individuals are more attuned to the Afghan culture than our Afghan partners.”  Therefore, he directs that all operations be conducted in partnership with Afghan forces, including the “planning and execution phases.”

Such joint planning for the employment of a novel and non-lethal directed energy technology on the battlefield might have helped mitigate any possible misunderstanding or ignorance of ADS’ non-lethal effects and avoided the embarrassment (and cost) of sending the system to Afghanistan only to have it crated up and returned stateside before ever being used.  According to one report, the ADS now “languishes in politically correct limbo” with “commanders unwilling to take the media heat for employing a ‘death ray’ on ‘innocent civilians.”

Ironically, domestic law enforcement may be the first to use a spin-off of the Defense Department technology.  The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department recently held a press conference announcing they are evaluating the use of a millimeter-wave “Assault Intervention Device” for preventing inmate assaults.  According to Sheriff Lee Baca, this device “appears uniquely suited to address some of the more difficult inmate violence issues….” Charles “Sid” Heal, formerly with the L.A. Sheriff’s Department, reportedly summed the situation up thusly:  “If we try and succeed we’ve become heroes in that we accepted a risk the Department of Defense refused — even after they spent $40 million of the taxpayers money and even while they’re killing people, because [they] are unwilling to use it.”

The military’s inability or unwillingness to counter negative publicity or false charges regarding ADS is a sad commentary on our ability to harness technology in support of our warfighting goals and to counter the propaganda efforts of our enemies or inaccurate press reports.  It also appears to violate General Petraeus’ recent counterinsurgency guidance for Afghanistan, which calls on U.S. and coalition forces to “fight the information war aggressively” and “challenge disinformation.”

Moreover, the ADS experience in Afghanistan suggests that the military has a harder time wrestling with the moral, ethical, and political challenges of “weapons” designed to save lives than to take them.  Convincing skeptics – even within the U.S. military – of the advantages of non-lethal weapons systems appears to be an uphill battle and flies in the face of centuries of military culture, thinking, doctrine, and training.

Non-lethal weapons are not a panacea.  They are not a substitute for lethal means.  But they can be an important adjunct to the use of lethal force in situations where minimizing civilian casualties is essential to mission success.  They can also be a useful tool for shaping the operational environment to U.S advantage.  Indeed, the need to “shape the conditions” of the battlefield was highlighted by Gen. Petraeus in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this summer.

Unfortunately, without a serious commitment by the civilian and military leadership to make the strategic case for non-lethal weapons systems like ADS, a more aggressive effort by the military services to understand the value of and incorporate these technologies into operational plans, and a re-evaluation of the U.S. military’s strategic communications effort, new technologies to protect the American warfighter may never be deployed in the face of an unwillingness to counter the propaganda efforts of America’s enemies or the misinformation perpetrated by the blogosphere.

The importance of effectively countering such propaganda regarding directed energy weapons was highlighted three years ago by the Defense Science Board, which called for “a concerted education effort to replace the ‘death ray’ myth of directed weapons with a comprehensive understanding of the potential benefits and limitations of their application.”  It appears little progress has been made toward this goal.

Despite the Afghanistan experience, ADS may still play a useful role in contingency operations where the use of lethal force is not always the best option.  Tailoring our response to the ever-changing nature of conflict and the imperative of ensuring that tactical successes do not become strategic defeats will be increasingly important in future military operations.

We should not allow this opportunity missed to become an opportunity lost.

David J. Trachtenberg is president and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting and a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 2001-2003.

(Photo: Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate)

In an article in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, AEI’s Gary Schmitt and Cheryl Miller pointed out that members of America’s military today hail from an increasingly slim segment of society:

The nearly three million members of the U.S. Armed Forces have been at war for nearly a decade. While combat troops are being withdrawn from Iraq, surge forces are still deploying in Afghanistan and many soldiers are on their second or third tour of duty. Americans hold this service and sacrifice in high regard—but they do so increasingly from a distance. This is a threat to our country’s civic ethic of equal sacrifice.

Few Americans today have a personal connection to the military. Veterans represent 9% of the total population (a number that continues to decline), and less than 1% serves in any of the military services, active duty or reserves.

Soldiers also come from a narrower segment of society—geographically and culturally—than ever before. Nearly half of all Army recruits come from military families. Southerners disproportionately populate all the branches, while the middle-class suburbs surrounding the nation’s largest cities—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia—produce relatively few service members despite having a large percentage of the nation’s youth population.

One strategy for resolving these disparities may involve increasing the number of ROTC programs in regions currently underrepresented in the services. “If students lack a point of access to the military, such as a local ROTC program,” Schmitt and Miller explain, “they are unlikely to join.”

Read the full piece here.

(flickr/The U.S. Army)

Last week, I offered some first impressions on this year’s DOD China military power report. I expanded on those yesterday over at the National Review Online, where I discussed both what the report tells us about Congress and the Obama administration and what it doesn’t tell us about China’s military modernization. I argue that the administration should be more concerned with deterring, rather than reassuring, Beijing. I conclude:

This requires both an unwavering commitment to the security of U.S. allies and partners in Asia – including Taiwan – and the maintenance of an American preponderance of military power in the region. The role of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region should be, first and foremost, to deter Chinese aggression. Absent a robust, resilient force in the region, Beijing will be tempted to resort to force to achieve its goals. And absent an honest public debate in this country about China’s rise – a debate the report fails to foster – that robust, resilient force may one day be a thing of the past.

For more on the DOD report’s shortcomings, read the rest here.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 1st Class Tiffini M. Jones/Released)

Guernica is featuring a must-read excerpt from Michael Mandelbaum’s fascinating—and frightening—new book, The Frugal Superpower. In it, the author explains how the United States’ massive debt and skyrocketing entitlement costs stand to constrain and transform American foreign policy as we have known it for the last sixty years:

Over the preceding half century the American government’s priorities, as revealed by the distribution of its expenditures, had undergone a basic shift—from guns to butter. For almost all of history, governments the world over had devoted their resources mainly to building and maintaining the military forces necessary to defend their countries and to pursue whatever military goals they set for themselves beyond their borders. By the first decade of the twenty-first century the federal government of the United States, judging by the pattern of its spending, was well on its way to becoming a giant domestic insurance company, albeit one with a sideline in foreign policy. As expensive as Social Security and Medicare had become by 2008, however, they will be even more expensive in the years ahead. In 2008, all forms of government-supplied pensions and health care (including Medicaid) constituted about 4 percent of total American output; at present rates they will rise steadily for decades until, by 2050, they account for a full 18 percent of everything the United States produces. This growth will fundamentally transform the public life of the United States and therefore the country’s foreign policy. The costs of the developments the events of September 15, 2008 triggered, along with the massive increase in the costs of America’s entitlement programs, will claim an ever increasing share of America’s national wealth, to the detriment of American foreign policy.

The full article is well worth a read.

(U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Erik Gudmundson)

It’s been a summer of discontent for the United States and China. With recent disputes over the South China Sea and over U.S.-ROK exercises around the Korean peninsula, with China aggressively exercising its military, and with the recent publication of the annual DOD report on Chinese military power, the relationship has seen better days. In a short essay published today by AEI, I take a look at Chinese media coverage of the recent kerfuffles and at some of the underlying reasons for China’s more assertive behavior. Given the strained relationship, I argue that times are ripe for a true crisis and that such a crisis might be difficult to manage:

In the event of a crisis, an angry citizenry in combination with an increasingly assertive PLA and a possible faltering economy might make for a new and different political dynamic within China, one in which the CCP feels pressured to burnish its nationalist credentials. One hopes that the leadership in Beijing is capable of responsibly navigating a crisis in the face of such a dynamic. The United States would do well to prepare—diplomatically and militarily—should that not be the case.

Read the rest here.

(DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Bobbie G. Attaway, U.S. Navy/Released)

In yesterday’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus reported on the Army’s plans to upgrade airbases and build a series of new special operations facilities across Afghanistan. The story suggests that the construction efforts, due to be completed late next year, represent an investment in the United States’ long-term posture in Afghanistan, and provide further indication that the U.S. mission in the country will continue well beyond the summer of 2011. This is an encouraging development.

The construction plans, focused as they are on enhancing access for special operations forces and expanding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (see here and here), also hint at the likely shift in the character of the Afghan mission as conventional U.S. forces are slowly drawn down between next summer and 2014 (the notional deadline set at last month’s Kabul conference for the final withdrawal of foreign troops).

As General Petraeus explained in a recent interview with Wired’s Danger Room, special operations forces currently serve as a critical kinetic component of the population-centric counterinsurgency campaign underway in Afghanistan, countering IED networks and pursuing high-value targets. But as U.S. forces begin to transfer greater responsibility to their Afghan counterparts, counterinsurgency operations slowly wind down, and American lines are increasingly thinned, special operations forces may well represent the primary remaining U.S. presence in the country.

Although a sizeable stability, training, and advisory force—similar to that which now remains in Iraq—would be a preferable alternative, the United States should, at the least, seek to maintain in Afghanistan a series of hubs from which elite forces could continue to conduct counterterrorism operations within the country and regionally. The upgraded bases described in the Post article would seem to fit the bill nicely.

Keeping in mind that this is all a long way off—and there’s a war to win in the meantime—it’s nonetheless good to see that the United States is setting the conditions to allow for a sustained presence in  the perennially troubled and strategically vital region.

(Photo: flickr/The U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Horace Murray)