Refighting Tora Bora
In the rush of the final days prior to President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan, Sen. John Kerry released a report — through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is the chairman — refighting the 2001 battle of Tora Bora. It was the moment, according to Kerry, where “we failed to get [Osama] bin Laden,” which of course accounts for all our troubles in Afghanistan today. Or so many believe.
Kerry’s report does not appear to have affected the president’s decision in any way, and this might seem like a matter simply of historical curiosity today, but the “myth” or conventional-wisdom narrative of the Afghanistan war is as important, and in many ways more powerful, as the reality. One of the reasons some could embrace Afghanistan as the “good war” was because it had been so botched, they argue, by the Bush Administration, and particularly former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I’ve hardly been an ardent Rummy fan, but it’s important to distinguish truth from fiction in this case.
The Kerry report rests on three critical issues. First, should U.S. planners have anticipated the course of the Tora Bora battle? Second, were sufficient U.S. forces in place to fight the battle in a different way? And third, if so, what were the odds of capturing or killing Osama?
Let’s take point one. To begin with, it’s worth remembering how surprising and rapid a success Operation Enduring Freedom was. The campaign began with air strikes on October 7, 2001; the combination of air power, CIA and special operations forces, and the Northern Alliance of mostly Tajik and Uzbek militias overwhelmed one Taliban stronghold after another. Kandahar fell on November 13 and Kunduz several days later. While the ability of these militias to operate in the Pashtun-dominated south was open to question, the initial U.S. concern had been to limit North Alliance operations in the south, lest they exact revenge and make a post-war settlement more difficult. While some CIA operatives were doubtful of how the militias would perform at Tora Bora, they had previously been more effective than anticipated. In sum, U.S. planners made a reasonable choice to continue with successful tactics.
On to point two. Even by the beginning of the battle in the Tora Bora mountains on December 12, few U.S. forces had arrived in Afghanistan or were capable of further large-scale operations. It was not until November 25 that the first large-scale conventional forces, Marines, established Camp Rhino about 100 miles southwest of Kandahar. Elements of the 3rd Ranger Battalion were also deployed. The fight at Tora Bora (several hundred kilometers from Camp Rhino) began December 12. While there may have been sufficient infantry, a more doubtful question is whether they had sufficient mobility and, in particular, helicopter lift to carry off a sizeable cordoning operation. It is noteworthy that, during Operation Anaconda in March 2002, there were only enough CH-47 helicopters on-scene to lift two infantry companies at one time.
This leads to point three, which is essentially an argument about time. On this issue, a quote from the SOF commander known by the nom de guerre “Dalton Fury” and himself a critic of the Tora Bora failure, on target: “My opinion is that bin Laden would have left earlier” – Osama is thought to have crossed into Pakistan on December 16 – “as soon as he received word that U.S. troops were surrounding him.” As was to be the case in Operation Anaconda, the Taliban and al Qaeda would have had plenty of advance warning of large-scale, conventional force movements.
But the largest misconception behind the Kerry report is the undying belief that a counterterrorism, raiding strategy will solve our problems in the region. If only we’d gotten bin Laden in 2001. If only the Pakistanis would tell us where he is now. If only this war could be fought rapidly, precisely and from a distance. If only.
Tom Donnelly is director of the Center for Defense Studies.
