And by “strategy,” we meant…
After waiting with anticipation, then carefully parsing the administration’s new, much-publicized Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy released in March, many observers are now justifiably confused by the administration’s apparent return to a discussion of the first principles of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan–what many assumed was a matter of settled law. The strategy described by the president and his advisers in the spring was thorough and fully explicated. As undersecretary of defense for policy Michele Flournoy explained at the time,
“what we’re doing is stepping up to more fully resource a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan that is designed to first reverse Taliban gains and secure the population, particularly in the most contested areas of the south and east; second, provide the Afghan national security forces with the training and the mentoring they need to expand rapidly and to take–ultimately take the lead in providing security for their nation; and finally, to provide a secure environment that will enable governance and development efforts to take root and grow.”
The administration’s metrics for Afghanistan leaked last week highlighted the same goals: “defeat the extremist insurgency, secure the Afghan populace, and develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces.” And the theater assessment conducted by Gen. Stanley McChrystal over the summer, the results of which were described today in the Washington Post, was an effort to map-out and articulate potential operational courses of action to achieve the president’s strategic objectives. In it, Gen. McChrystal seems very much on the same page as Ms. Flournoy: “Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign.”
Nevertheless, echoing a point he made repeatedly in the course of his weekend media blitz, the president noted on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that “Until I’m satisfied that we’ve got the right strategy, I’m not going to be sending some young man or woman over there–beyond what we already have.”
So what gives? It can only be assumed that the president’s strategic objectives have shifted, or that the administration is somehow dissatisfied with elements of the military plan conceived by Gen. McChrystal. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung suggest in today’s Post, it’s likely some combination of the two: the commander’s forthcoming force recommendations are causing heartburn in the White House at a time when the administration is growing increasingly skittish about declining public support for the war, and is therefore thinking seriously about implementing a more limited counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan–despite the strident strategic pronouncements of its advisers six months ago, and the more recent judgments of the commander in country.
Perhaps the most alarming moment of the president’s “Meet the Press” appearance was his assertion that he’s “not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan or saving face or, in some way– you know, sending a message that America is here for the duration.”
Whoa.
To be fair, the president may well have been trying to say that he wasn’t interested an indefinite occupation of Afghanistan, or something to that effect. But words matter, and “we’re here for the duration” is exactly what commanders on the ground–currently intent on conducting a population-centric COIN campaign, as directed–are trying to communicate to the citizens of Afghanistan, many of whom have in the past suffered coercion at the hands of the Taliban following the departure of coalition forces from their villages and towns. (Gen. Larry Nicholson noted these concerns among Afghan villagers in the course of the Marines’ recent operations in Helmand.)
But assuming that the president indeed meant what he said–and that increasingly seems to be the case–it’s critical to remember that the Taliban, our Afghan allies, and others in the region all calibrate their individual strategies according to the perceived level of U.S. commitment to Afghanistan. We can’t afford to reaffirm the conclusion that many of those actors have no doubt already reached: the American presence in Afghanistan is transitory, despite all our talk of an enduring partnership. By doing so, we only further frustrate our chances of success, regardless of how limited or expansive the definition of success may be.
Tim Sullivan is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
