What’s Left Unsaid
Close readers of Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s Afghanistan assessment will no doubt be intrigued by the many redactions: what’s been left out is in some ways more interesting and more likely contains what’s new about the general’s approach. Indeed, the assessment as presented is really a consensus of well informed opinion on the subject; where it begins to blaze new ground is most often where the trail disappears into…REDACTION.
There are too many redactions in the full 66-pager to discuss here. But consider, for instance, the passage in which McChrystal is discussing the role of Mullah Omar, the shadowy one-eyed spiritual leader of the Taliban and head of the Quetta shura. The subject of the redaction is the operational effect of Mullah Omar’s annual guidance, that is, the connection between the supreme commander’s intent and what happens on the battlefield. It’s interesting that, for all the ink spilled on Taliban and al Qaeda personalities, there’s been precious little public understanding of how they actually exercise leadership and command. It’s a very encouraging sign, therefore, that McChrystal’s assessment team looked into these dynamics; even if in fact we know relatively little, at least we’re looking in the right place.
Not surprisingly, the redactions really begin to mount in the annex on military plans. It’s clear, though, that McChrystal got to the heart of the command and control problems of the International Security and Assistance Force. The first redaction in this section also indicates that the general began with the right question: whether the ISAF operations plan truly followed U.S. and NATO guidance. That’s a tougher question than it might seem: preserving unity of command or effort in a coalition, particularly as in Afghanistan where national goals are so divergent, is not easy. As a second redaction suggests, coalition plans tend to become aggregations of minutiae “not linked to decisive points [or] decisive conditions”–that is, they become designs for going on, not going forward.
The third redaction addresses this point more plainly, and comes in the course of noting that NATO’s regional commands are not linked “under a coherent, single, nationwide strategy,” despite years of ISAF effort. This is a point that the fourth redaction in the planning section makes clear. And the fifth and final redaction adds that planning not just across NATO military forces but also civilian efforts–especially in the critical but overly emphasized area of counternarcotics–has been haphazard.
At the same time it is notable that, even after identifying the many shortcomings of the ISAF campaign plan, McChrystal recommends that “major elements” of the current plan of operations should be retained, as “the document is sufficient to complement the efforts of external agencies.” This is an ironic and belated kudo to Gen. David McKiernan, who was criticized heavily for taking a lowest-common-denominator approach to the mission. “Significant change may be counterproductive in the short term,” the assessment explains, given that the current “Comprehensive and Integrated Approach…is understood by critical stakeholders”–that is, the Afghans, Europeans, and other actors like the UN. In sum, the oceanliner is headed in more or less the right direction, and a sharp turn might capsize the ship.
Tom Donnelly is the director of the Center for Defense Studies.
