PACOM’s First Responsibility

This week, Adm. Robert F. Willard, a former Navy fighter pilot, took control of the U.S. Pacific Command.  He replaces Adm. Timothy Keating.  It’s a huge job, with a huge area of responsibility (from California to the Indian Ocean) and no small amount of resources (including almost 2/3 the U.S. Navy fleet and some 325,000 military personnel from all military branches).

Needless to say, one of the most pressing problems he will face is the rapidly improving and increasingly aggressive Chinese military.  According to press reports, in a blog post from last month, Willard wrote that engaging China has been difficult “and at times our encounters with Chinese military forces have been less than constructive in nature.” He then went on to say, “we need to understand who our counterparts are,” and “we have to get to know one another.”

At one level, the admiral’s comments were predictable and of a character we have come to expect from the head of the Pacific Command.  Far more than any one U.S. ambassador or assistant secretary of state, Willard, like his predecessors, will wield an enormous amount of clout — not only military but diplomatic sway, as well.  He has more power, more goodies to give, more reach than any diplomat could possibly imagine.  And as Secretary Gates noted in remarks marking the passing of the command, “Leading a military organization in this part of the world requires a deft touch, a diplomat’s sensibilities, a scholar’s sense of the past and a commercial tycoon’s business savvy.”

But, that said, is this what we really expected when we established the unified commands under Goldwater-Nichols?  Wasn’t the real goal to make sure the commands were ready to operate smoothly and jointly when called into action?  Did we really intend to create American-style proconsuls?

Now, maybe this all inevitable and, given the fact that the commands are unified, simply a by-product of that fact.  Nevertheless, it would be nice to see a PACOM commander (and maybe Admiral Willard will turn out to be such a commander) who thinks and publicly endorses the idea that his first responsibility is deterring our adversaries and giving substance to our military alliances in the region.  Getting “to know one another” — a euphemism that belies the fact that we know well enough what the Chinese military aspires to be — may be part of the job but it certainly ought not be a commander’s priority.

Gary Schmitt is director of advanced strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute.