On March 26, 2010, a North Korean mini-sub slipped past the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto western sea border separating the two Koreas, and fired what has now been identified as a CHT-02D, indigenously produced, wake-homing torpedo at the Cheonan South Korean Navy ship. The torpedo exploded just below the hull of the Cheonan, producing a “shockwave bubble effect” that literally split the South Korean ship in half. The results of the attack were both compelling and tragic for South Korea. Forty-six sailors (out of a crew of 104 aboard) perished as the ship sank, and more people were killed in the salvage and rescue efforts that followed.
Since 1999, the NLL has been a growing source of contention between the two Koreas, and the Cheonan attack is easily the most deadly manifestation of the competition over the disputed border. But it was certainly not the first provocation initiated by the North Koreans, and it is unlikely to be the last. Most of the previous incidents in the vicinity of the NLL, described in detail below, have had four things in common: 1) they are intentionally initiated at moments when they have the likelihood of garnering the greatest attention on the regional and perhaps even the world stage; 2) they initially appear to be incidents that are relatively small, easily contained, and quickly “resolved;” 3) they involve continuously changing tactics and techniques; and 4) North Korea denies responsibility for the event. Certainly, this most recent violent provocation fulfills all four of the key factors listed above.
What’s Next For the Iraqi Police?
Last Friday, Defense News reported that as of October 2011, the State Department will resume responsibility for managing U.S. police training and advising efforts in Iraq, a task overseen by the Department of Defense since 2004. The shift, a function of the broader changes underway in the United States’ role and presence in Iraq, could have some serious implications for the prospects of the long-term U.S-Iraqi strategic partnership.
In recent years, U.S. forces have played a critical role in shaping Iraq’s security sector, expanding capacity and providing strategic guidance within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, and partnering U.S. military police units with elements of the Iraqi police. The State Department contribution has been minimal by comparison, and dominated by contractors.
The new State-run effort will reportedly focus exclusively on professionalization, leader development, and special skills training. In terms of personnel, “the program will involve a mix of up to 2,000 State Department and other government employees and contractors, including private security providers who will operate from three main bases and make trips to about 50 police offices and training academies.”
Currents of Cooperation, Currents of Conflict
President Obama’s West Point commencement speech is being widely spun as a preview of the administration’s full-scale National Security Strategy, due — no kidding this time! — this week. If so, it’s probable that the NSS is yet another Polonius-like emanation from the White House.
The Left gets the usual rhetorical goodies; thus, in its speech coverage, the New York Times solemnly lauded a “strategy based in diplomacy” and Huffington Post/Washington Note blogger Steve Clemons concluded that the speech “show[ed] signs of a smart national security strategy.” As we all know, the Bush Doctrine was premised upon a desire for “preventive war” and “dumb power,” or whatever the opposite of “smart power” may be.
The line that has the Left all a-twitter — along with the renewal-at-home bits — is the president’s assertion that “America has not succeeded by stepping out of the current of cooperation — we have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice, so nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities and face consequences when they don’t.” But this is not really a Left argument so much as the traditional liberal idea that international society can be governed by great-power consensus. This is more George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” or early-Clinton “assertive mutilateralism” than McGovernite “come home America.”
And all except the most paleo of conservatives will remark upon the president’s embrace of American exceptionalism: “A fundamental part of our strategy for our security has to be America’s support for those universal rights that formed the creed of our founding.”
But what really separates the parties in the United States in regard to foreign policy is the use of military power, which is the essence of strategy. Our creed — that is, our political principles — is a reflection of our belief that the currents of history can be made to flow in the direction of liberty and justice. But modern liberals believe that is the natural direction, and that all its takes is “cooperation” to make it so; after all, these are “self-evident” principles that all enlightened peoples share. Conservatives, by contrast, believe that politics is competition, and thus to thrive, American principles must be made evident and secured by force or the threat of force. If the currents of international affairs are to flow toward liberty and justice, it requires lots of engineering, constant investment and tireless effort.
The Season of Our Nuclear Discontent
Thankfully, the season that has become known as Washington’s “nuclear spring” is almost over. Just like March, it came in like a lion and is going out like a lamb.
Much of the hoopla surrounding this nuclear spring involved the signing of a New START accord with Russia, the release of the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, and the traditional 5-year review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the United Nations. Yes, it has been a busy season for nuclear aficionados. But to what end?
The New START treaty was supposed to improve our relationship with Russia and to serve as a carrot that would provide an inducement for Moscow to be more sympathetic to American foreign policy objectives. Enlisting Moscow’s cooperation on sanctioning Iran for its continued nuclear activities has been a key objective of the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations. Despite New START, Russia has refused to support any meaningful sanctions on Tehran.
Last week, however, Russia reportedly agreed to a watered-down draft UN resolution against Iran, which the administration hailed as a triumph. Yet this was no triumph occasioned by the new relationship symbolized by New START. As both The Washington Post and The New York Times pointed out, Russian agreement to the mild UN resolution on Iran came after the United States quietly caved to Russian demands to lift sanctions on four Russian companies responsible for illicit weapons and technology exports to Tehran.
The New York Times has never been accused of pandering to the anti-Obama crowd, but its headline was telling: “U.S. Makes Concessions to Russia for Iran Sanctions.” The article noted this was merely the latest in a string of concessions to Moscow, which include revival of the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation that was suspended after Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and the scrapping of the Bush administration’s European-based missile defense plan.
Earlier this week, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 5136, which authorizes $567 billion in budget authority for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the national security programs of the Department of Energy (DOE), was successfully passed by the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. The bill also authorizes $159 billion to support overseas contingency operations during Fiscal Year 2011 and authorizes $34 billion for Fiscal Year 2010 supplemental appropriations for overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and to provide humanitarian and disaster assistance to assist victims following the earthquake in Haiti.
I’m pleased to report that Republican members on the committee improved the already strong piece of legislation that provides for our military and sends a unified message to our military personnel that we continue to support them.
The legislation highlights our support by providing a 1.9 percent basic pay raise and authorizes funding to continue fighting the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other commendable initiatives include provisions that make significant contributions to the National Guard and Reserve Equipment account and fund the F-136 alternative engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. Also worthy of mention is that the mark takes steps to address some of the unfunded requests of the Services Chiefs.
The committee-passed NDAA updates reporting requirements, including asking for the conditions and criteria that will be used to measure progress in Afghanistan, instead of allowing the ticking Washington political clock to determine our end state. This provision, along with a reporting requirement on how the Department of Defense is addressing the indirect fire threat on U.S. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Afghanistan, are only first steps to supporting General McChrystal and our deployed troops. But they are important efforts in getting the resources to theater so our troops can accomplish their mission with the least possible risk.
On top of these provisions, Republicans were still able to include several critical amendments to make the legislation better and strengthen our national security. One such example was Representative John Kline’s measure to ensure that life-saving combat enablers — such as force protection, Medical Evacuation, and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities — are deployed in time to fully support the 30,000 additional troops scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan by this summer.
An amendment by Representative Trent Franks was also accepted. This effort would require the Administration to develop and report to Congress on a National Military Strategic Plan to deal with Iran’s defiant pursuit of nuclear weapons. Mr. Franks’ amendment is a substantial step forward in countering nuclear proliferation.
All-in-all, the Fiscal Year 2011 defense bill reflects bipartisan collaboration combined with some strong improvements by committee Republicans, and I’m looking forward to bringing it to the floor for House passage next week.
U.S. Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-Calif.) serves as the senior Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. McKeon represents California’s Twenty-Fifth Congressional District, which includes Fort Irwin, Edwards Air Force Base, Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, and the Marine Mountain Warfare Training Center.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Clay Lancaster.)
NSS: The Waiting is the Hardest Part
At least that’s what Tom Petty says, and apparently he knows a thing or two about the Obama National Security Strategy. “Next week!” is the RUMINT, and maybe this time for sure.
Does it matter?
Yes and no. Considering that first-order principles like strategy ought not to change capriciously, there’s no real need — beyond what the law says — to reinvent the wheel on an annual basis. This administration could even reaffirm the essentials of American strategy while continuing to distance itself from the Bush era. Preemptive attack (a long-time anti-Bush talking point) is a kind of engagement, not really a strategy.
But the world does want to hear from Barack Obama. The increasingly common assumption is that the 21st century will be a time of American decline, the “Asian century” or the “rise of the rest.” The president has spoken variously about the need for American international leadership, sometimes energetically and sometimes apologetically. He also frequently sounds as though international order is based upon international law rather than the struggles of states for power. And finally, he has sounded occasionally unsure about whether the current American-centric world is really that good a thing.
Americans, too, need guidance from their president. For a politician who’s all about the vision, Barack Obama has been surprisingly reluctant to set forth anything like a doctrine for the use of American power in the world. Since the end of the Cold War, we’ve had a very hard time figuring out in advance what we think is worth fighting for, with the result that we always seem surprised when some red line is crossed and we scramble to respond. This is a problem, too, for the U.S. government and not least the Department of Defense, which appears to be setting itself for another dose of cuts and reductions based upon “fiscal realities,” not strategic realities.
So even if the Obama NSS turns out to be oatmeal, let’s serve it up and get a taste.
(Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
McMaster at AEI
Next Thursday, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster will be speaking at AEI on the challenges of command in counterinsurgency operations. His remarks will be drawn in part from his chapter titled “Centralization vs. Decentralization: Preparing for and Practicing Mission Command in Counterinsurgency Operations,” in the recently released AEI volume, Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields. This is an important topic for today’s Army—one that, according to retired Lt. Gen. Dave Barno’s recent account, was addressed at the Army War College’s annual “Unified Quest” futures war game (a program led by none other than Brig. Gen. McMaster).
This will be a can’t-miss event. Register here.
(Photo: flickr/FortBraggParaglide)
NATO Lurches into the Future
Yesterday, the group of experts tasked with providing NATO’s Secretary General guidance in crafting the alliance’s new Strategic Concept released a report titled “NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement.” NATO’s current Strategic Concept was published in 1999—it’s clearly long overdue for an update. Thus, the report outlines the new threats which NATO must be prepared to engage in the years ahead, including terrorism, piracy, and cyber-attacks; it also argues that NATO should expand its contingency planning efforts and “[enhance] its ability to prevail in military operations and broader security missions beyond its borders.” At the same time, however, the report takes a cautious tone with respect to the likelihood of future out-of-area operations:
“For all its assets, NATO is by no means the sole answer to every problem affecting international security. NATO is a regional, not a global organisation; its authority and resources are limited and it has no desire to take on missions that other institutions and countries can handle successfully. Accordingly, the new Strategic Concept should prescribe guidelines for NATO as it makes decisions about when and where to apply its resources outside Alliance borders.”
The message here seems to be that while NATO should indeed have the planning capacity and military capabilities to conduct these sorts of operations, it should be exceedingly deliberate in committing to do so. Encouragingly, the document goes on to acknowledge the many lessons to be gleaned from the mission in Afghanistan (and no, it’s not “we’re never doing that again”):
“The Allied experience in Afghanistan is a rich source of lessons to be learned. Many of the principles that should be featured in the new Strategic Concept are in evidence. These include the requirement for Alliance cohesion, the desirability of unified command, the value of effective planning and public diplomacy, the aptness of a comprehensive civilian/military approach, and the need to deploy forces at a strategic distance for an extended period of time.”
Ideas in Action: Assessing the Afghan Surge
Last week on PBS’s “Ideas in Action,” Tom Donnelly debated the prospects of the administration’s Afghanistan strategy with Andrew Exum of CNAS and Matthew Hoh, a former State Department officer in Afghanistan (3161) whose resignation caused a small stir within the Beltway last fall. Check it out:
