The Obama Administration has moved from the rinse to the spin cycle in its efforts to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal without scaring the pants off America’s allies. The first rotation came from Vice President Joe Biden in a February 18 speech at the National Defense University.  But the tempo has increased with a Sunday New York Times piece, written from White House sources by David Sanger and Thom Shanker previewing the hotly debated and delayed Nuclear Posture Review.

As my friend Tom Mahnken pointed out over at Shadow Government, there is a yet another contradiction at play in Obama’s nuclear policy.  A year ago in Prague, the president revealed his commitment to a nuclear-free world.  Those were the headiest yes-we-can days, and the speech talked of deep nuclear force reductions, formal ratification of a global test ban and a renewed and expanded nonproliferation treaty; it was all about arms control.

If the Sanger-Shanker piece is a preview of what the White House hopes the NPR headline — that’s Nuclear Posture Review, not National Public Radio — will be, many of the Prague themes have been muted, if not entirely obscured.  According to the Times, administration “aides say [the president] will permanently reduce America’s arsenal by thousands of weapons.”  But while that sounds like a lot, most of the weapons in question will come from those in storage, not those still active and deployed.  Sanger and Shanker also made a big deal of the White House’s rejection of a hard “no-first-use” policy, something long desired by arms control advocates.  “We’re under considerable pressure on this one within our own party,” one source told the two reporters. And they quoted Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association that retreating from the no-first-use pledge “wouldn’t be consistent with what the president said in Prague.”

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It’s hard not to marvel (or shudder, more likely) at the complexity of India’s security environment: from edgy nuclear neighbors and determined jihadists to indigenous Maoist insurgents, the country faces an unenviable array of threats. It’s not surprising, then, that Delhi has seen fit to expand its defense budget for 2011 by 4 percent — following on the heels of last year’s massive increase, which raised Indian defense spending by more than a quarter.

A significant portion of the additional funds will be dedicated to personnel costs, of course, but India is also investing aggressively in capabilities to address threats from across the spectrum — expanding the country’s paramilitary and police forces, procuring UAVs and other updated C4ISR systems for each of its armed services, and modernizing the country’s air force and undersea capabilities.

India, as I’ve noted previously, is also refining its warfighting doctrine and defense posture in an effort to adapt to what it perceives, rightly, as the new strategic reality in Asia. That reality, as my colleague Dan Blumenthal points out in today’s Wall Street Journal, is dominated by an increasingly ambitious and militarily capable China and a strategically ambivalent United States: “President Obama’s accommodating stance toward China and his apparent lack of interest in cementing partnership with Delhi have focused Indian minds, as have his failure to invest in resources his Pacific commanders need,” Dan argues.

No less important, however, is India’s ongoing rivalry with Pakistan. Relations between the two hit yet another rough patch in the wake of last month’s bombing in Pune, and the subsequent bilateral talks in New Delhi between the countries’ foreign secretaries — the first since the 2008 Mumbai attacks — were predictably unfruitful. According to Pakistani officials, the new Indian defense budget the proposed “two-front war” doctrine only stand to further compromise stability in the region.

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For all the cyber buffs out there, make sure to check out and bookmark The Cyber Loop. Among other things, the new blog keeps its finger on the pulse of recent developments and potential future trends in the arena of cyber security and cyber strategy. The site’s self-proclaimed goal is to “further the development of strategic thought in the cyberspace domain.” A worthwhile endeavor if you ask us. Here is a brief overview of its mission and purpose.

In the coming month, the Center for Defense Studies will release a new collection of essays, edited by Tom Donnelly and Frederick Kagan, titled Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields. The volume features contributions from a series of national security luminaries: Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, Peter Feaver, Mac Owens, Major General Charles Dunlap, and Colonel (Ret.)Bob Killebrew. More details are available here.

UPDATE: The table of contents from Lessons for a Long War is available for download here.

At NATO’s recent Strategic Concept Seminar in Washington, the fourth and final one before the Group of Experts chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright begins to draft its recommendations for the new Strategic Concept, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates outlined his ideas for NATO’s future structures, forces, and capabilities. In his opening remarks, Gates pointed out that most of the defense planning assumptions enshrined in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept are still valid today. The same holds true for NATO’s core functions. First, the alliance remains a military alliance focused on protecting the territorial sovereignty, political integrity, and security of its members. Second, the alliance remains committed to deterring potential enemies and, should this become necessary, fighting them collectively. Lastly, NATO continues to operate on the premise that member nations will fulfill their Article 5 collective defense commitments and obligations. While these fundamental tenets are presumed to hold true today, the new task for NATO is to recommit itself to the common defense of its members and sharpen the core missions and purposes of the alliance.

From a strategic perspective, according to the secretary, the most important institutional development has been NATO’s transition from a “static, defensive force” premised on Cold War defense planning assumptions to an expeditionary fighting force that can project military power and provide security in complex out-of-area operations. This, of course, was first evidenced by the Balkan wars in the late 1990s and now confirmed by NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan. It is now a truism that alliance security and interests are no longer solely a function of territorial sovereignty. Turmoil and upheaval in remote areas of the world can have serious effects on alliance members in Europe and North America. More concretely, Gates argued that the new concept must aim to strengthen the credibility of Article 5 and enhance NATO’s strategic deterrence through improved contingency planning, military exercises, and force postures.

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Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s maiden operation in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province — Operation “Moshtarak” (which as we all now know, means “together” in Dari) in and around the town of Marjah — seems to have a lot riding on it.  The media is insisting it’s no less that a “test of President Obama’s war plan” and a potential “turning point in the war.”

So, a couple of weeks into the operation, what do we know?

First, we know that Taliban resistance is relatively light.  There are lots of sniper attacks and IEDs, but there have not been many attempts to hold the ground, despite the eminent defensibility of the town and the irrigated fields surrounding it.  Marjah has proved no Bala Hissar.  While it’s probably too late to really contest the outcome in Marjah or inflict enough casualties to make big headlines, it may well be that other Taliban groups and commanders will strike elsewhere.  Given that McChrystal has prepared an Afghan “government in a box,” that administrator Abdul Zahir has just very publicly popped out of that box to distribute rice and other goods along with Helmand provincial governor Ghulab Mangal, and that there is an effort already underway to resettle those who fled in the wake of the advance, the Taliban face at least a significant information defeat.  Their strategy thus far has been to play down the importance of the Marjah operation rather than directly contest it.

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Yesterday, my colleague Tim Sullivan drew attention to the simmering Sino-Indian military competition, which has been heating up over the past few years. As Tim pointed out, Delhi has recently taken important steps to redress some of the imbalances that have been developing. This competition is not, unfortunately, limited to the military domain.

China has expended much effort over the past decade courting India’s neighbors in South Asia and has effectively, although slowly, chipped away at India’s overriding influence in the countries on its immediate periphery, such as Nepal. China has long provided Nepal with development aid and, according to the New York Times, the country’s trade with China has quadrupled since 2003. In recent months, China has pledged to reduce tariffs on Nepalese goods and Nepal has promised to tighten their shared border.

So what’s the harm to India? By tightening up its border with China, Nepal will stem the flow of Tibetans moving between India and China. Though this will worry Indians because of human rights concerns and their sympathy for the Tibetan people, there is a strategic issue here as well. Much as China has an interest in ensuring that Pakistan remains a thorn in India’s side, Delhi has seen value in a restive Tibet since its traditional role as a buffer state was erased by China’s invasion and annexation. With the flow of communications and pro-Tibet agitators staunched, China may find it easier to maintain stability in the “autonomous region,” which will allow it turn its gaze outward. India, on the other hand, will find it increasingly difficult to play the “Tibet card.”

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With concerns mounting that the recent collapse of the coalition government in the Netherlands could lead to a “domino effect” among other NATO states facing domestic opposition to the extension of their Afghanistan mandates, Denmark remains an outlier — a small state with a small military that has been punching well above its weight in Afghanistan and shows few signs of letting up. As the Wall Street Journal reports today, Denmark’s government has managed to sustain consistent public support for the conflict, despite one of the highest casualty rates in proportion to the size of the country’s military contribution to the mission. Free from any debilitating national “caveats,” Denmark’s 750 soldiers have been playing an important role in partnering with British forces in Afghanistan’s restive Helmand province.

What’s more, with long-serving defense minister Søren Gade leading the way, Denmark has taken its participation in the Afghan conflict as an opportunity to reshape and modernize its armed forces — acquiring of a variety of additional armored fighting vehicles, setting goals for increased procurement spending and recruiting, and otherwise expanding its forces’ capacity to participate in expeditionary operations. The mission has also led to a serious discussion within the Danish defense community about adjustments to military doctrine and the development of balanced whole-of-government strategies necessary to effectively prosecute protracted, complex conflicts like that in Afghanistan.

In short, Denmark has embraced its role in Afghanistan in a way that many of the other NATO members have not, while at the same time signaling its preparedness for similar missions in the future.

Given the malaise that’s befallen NATO of late — outlined most recently in remarks on Tuesday by Secretary Gates, who noted that “the demilitarization of Europe…has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st” — the United States can’t afford to take allies like Denmark for granted.

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At a public event on Thursday at the United States Institute of Peace, AEI research fellow and CDS program manager Tim Sullivan will provide an update on the U.S. military’s activities in Haiti and discuss potential roles for the United States in enabling Haiti’s long-term stability. Register for the event here.

Video from a previous CDS event on Haiti, featuring remarks by Amb. Raymond Joseph, is available here.