Over the last month, U.S. forces have been steadily drawing down in Haiti. The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, which arrived three days after the earthquake, left the scene February 1; the 2,300 Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit were released from Joint Task Force-Haiti on February 7; Air National Guard units began scaling back their support for Operation Unified Response in late February; and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, which had been  operating throughout Port-au-Prince, began to return home in recent days.

As the demand for immediate emergency relief subsided and international organizations and NGOs began to establish a foothold in Port-au-Prince, U.S. commanders in Haiti signaled an eagerness to “right-size” the force in the country for the evolving mission — swapping infantrymen for logisticians and engineers. According to the memorandum of understanding signed by U.S. and UN officials in the first weeks after the quake, American forces in Haiti were only ever expected to facilitate the distribution of relief materials, assess and repair critical infrastructure, and — if requested by MINUSTAH or the Haitian government — provide security assistance. In recent days, Gen. Douglas Fraser, U.S. SOUTHCOM commander, announced that “our mission is largely accomplished.”

There’s little doubt that the presence of U.S. troops in Haiti served as an important check on potential violence and unrest — keeping relative order at aid distribution points and deterring criminal activity. It’s not surprising, then, that residents of Port-au-Prince are reporting uneasiness about the U.S. troops’ departure, doubtful that the nearly 10,000-strong MINUSTAH peacekeeping force can adequately maintain order in the devastated city. The effectiveness of the Haitian National Police is also in doubt; as USIP’s Bob Perito noted last month, “there wasn’t much law enforcement to begin with, and now there’s even less.”

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Meghan O’Sullivan, the deputy national security adviser in the Bush Administration who helped to oversee the Iraq surge, has written the so-far best analysis of Iraq’s successful election.  Though composed and published on Sunday before the vote itself, her been-there-done-that-got-the-tee-shirt wisdom is a sober assessment of what the surge has done and what the prospect before us is now.  This passage is particularly forceful:

On Jan. 4, 2006, days after Iraq’s second election, President Bush announced that two U.S. combat brigades would be leaving Iraq, in addition to 20,000 troops whose tours had been extended for the vote. Some administration officials clearly hoped that a successful election promised greater stability. Instead, the subsequent negotiations over the government became a harbinger of the most violent Iraq since the days of Saddam Hussein. As I watch this new election, recalling the euphoria of those early Iraqi votes and marveling at the resilience of the Iraqi people in the years since, I am also sobered by the knowledge that the hardest work is yet to come.

But the column is also rare in that O’Sullivan’s past experience — and she worked on Iraq issues for a long and often-bleak time — hasn’t been so scarring as to blur her ability to see what the future might be.  Iraq is not necessarily headed for bright, sunny uplands, but it’s not really “unraveling,” as my friend Tom Ricks often writes, in the sense of going backward to the conditions of 2006.  Even if there is future sectarian conflict, it won’t be the same war as it was.  That was an al Qaeda-inspired war and the least-likely future for Iraq is the return of a Zarqawi-style extremism, as the relatively high Sunni participation in the election makes plain.

It’s a good bet that it will take the Iraqis some time to form a new government and that there will be repeated attempts to shape the outcome through violent means, not least by Iranian-sponsored groups.  This is also a time when the future of the U.S.-Iraq strategic partnership will be shaped profoundly; Gen. Raymond Odierno, the tactical architect of the surge and now overall U.S. commander in Iraq, has been eloquent in explaining this once-in-a-century point of deflection.  Yet for his part, President Obama concluded his remarks congratulating the Iraqis on the election by reiterating his campaign pledge that “by the end of next year, all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq.”

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It’s hard not to marvel (or shudder, more likely) at the complexity of India’s security environment: from edgy nuclear neighbors and determined jihadists to indigenous Maoist insurgents, the country faces an unenviable array of threats. It’s not surprising, then, that Delhi has seen fit to expand its defense budget for 2011 by 4 percent — following on the heels of last year’s massive increase, which raised Indian defense spending by more than a quarter.

A significant portion of the additional funds will be dedicated to personnel costs, of course, but India is also investing aggressively in capabilities to address threats from across the spectrum — expanding the country’s paramilitary and police forces, procuring UAVs and other updated C4ISR systems for each of its armed services, and modernizing the country’s air force and undersea capabilities.

India, as I’ve noted previously, is also refining its warfighting doctrine and defense posture in an effort to adapt to what it perceives, rightly, as the new strategic reality in Asia. That reality, as my colleague Dan Blumenthal points out in today’s Wall Street Journal, is dominated by an increasingly ambitious and militarily capable China and a strategically ambivalent United States: “President Obama’s accommodating stance toward China and his apparent lack of interest in cementing partnership with Delhi have focused Indian minds, as have his failure to invest in resources his Pacific commanders need,” Dan argues.

No less important, however, is India’s ongoing rivalry with Pakistan. Relations between the two hit yet another rough patch in the wake of last month’s bombing in Pune, and the subsequent bilateral talks in New Delhi between the countries’ foreign secretaries — the first since the 2008 Mumbai attacks — were predictably unfruitful. According to Pakistani officials, the new Indian defense budget the proposed “two-front war” doctrine only stand to further compromise stability in the region.

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Yesterday, my colleague Tim Sullivan drew attention to the simmering Sino-Indian military competition, which has been heating up over the past few years. As Tim pointed out, Delhi has recently taken important steps to redress some of the imbalances that have been developing. This competition is not, unfortunately, limited to the military domain.

China has expended much effort over the past decade courting India’s neighbors in South Asia and has effectively, although slowly, chipped away at India’s overriding influence in the countries on its immediate periphery, such as Nepal. China has long provided Nepal with development aid and, according to the New York Times, the country’s trade with China has quadrupled since 2003. In recent months, China has pledged to reduce tariffs on Nepalese goods and Nepal has promised to tighten their shared border.

So what’s the harm to India? By tightening up its border with China, Nepal will stem the flow of Tibetans moving between India and China. Though this will worry Indians because of human rights concerns and their sympathy for the Tibetan people, there is a strategic issue here as well. Much as China has an interest in ensuring that Pakistan remains a thorn in India’s side, Delhi has seen value in a restive Tibet since its traditional role as a buffer state was erased by China’s invasion and annexation. With the flow of communications and pro-Tibet agitators staunched, China may find it easier to maintain stability in the “autonomous region,” which will allow it turn its gaze outward. India, on the other hand, will find it increasingly difficult to play the “Tibet card.”

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With concerns mounting that the recent collapse of the coalition government in the Netherlands could lead to a “domino effect” among other NATO states facing domestic opposition to the extension of their Afghanistan mandates, Denmark remains an outlier — a small state with a small military that has been punching well above its weight in Afghanistan and shows few signs of letting up. As the Wall Street Journal reports today, Denmark’s government has managed to sustain consistent public support for the conflict, despite one of the highest casualty rates in proportion to the size of the country’s military contribution to the mission. Free from any debilitating national “caveats,” Denmark’s 750 soldiers have been playing an important role in partnering with British forces in Afghanistan’s restive Helmand province.

What’s more, with long-serving defense minister Søren Gade leading the way, Denmark has taken its participation in the Afghan conflict as an opportunity to reshape and modernize its armed forces — acquiring of a variety of additional armored fighting vehicles, setting goals for increased procurement spending and recruiting, and otherwise expanding its forces’ capacity to participate in expeditionary operations. The mission has also led to a serious discussion within the Danish defense community about adjustments to military doctrine and the development of balanced whole-of-government strategies necessary to effectively prosecute protracted, complex conflicts like that in Afghanistan.

In short, Denmark has embraced its role in Afghanistan in a way that many of the other NATO members have not, while at the same time signaling its preparedness for similar missions in the future.

Given the malaise that’s befallen NATO of late — outlined most recently in remarks on Tuesday by Secretary Gates, who noted that “the demilitarization of Europe…has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st” — the United States can’t afford to take allies like Denmark for granted.

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At a public event on Thursday at the United States Institute of Peace, AEI research fellow and CDS program manager Tim Sullivan will provide an update on the U.S. military’s activities in Haiti and discuss potential roles for the United States in enabling Haiti’s long-term stability. Register for the event here.

Video from a previous CDS event on Haiti, featuring remarks by Amb. Raymond Joseph, is available here.

Last Friday, the Indian Navy inducted a new platform into its fighter fleet: the Russian-made MiG-29K. The advanced aircraft, of which India is eventually expected to have 45, are intended for deployment on the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov, soon to be acquired from Russia). This “quantum leap” in the Indian Navy’s capabilities, as it was described by Defense Minister A.K. Antony, can be interpreted in part as a further manifestation of India’s emerging hedging strategy toward its northeastern neighbor.

In the past few months, India has taken a series of steps to enhance its power projection capabilities and otherwise adjust its regional posture so as to check Chinese military ambitions — expanding air force bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, developing high-altitude airstrips near disputed border regions, holding yet another successful test of the Agni III long-range nuclear-capable missile, and announcing planned tests of the Agni V (a missile capable of hitting even the most distant targets in China) later this year. Most notably, Chief of the Indian Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor outlined in December the contours of a new “two-front war” doctrine, whereby India’s armed forces would be trained, equipped, and positioned for simultaneous conflicts with Pakistan and China.

All along the way, Indian military officials have been fairly candid about the purpose of these steps: to deter Chinese aggression and hedge against the country’s growing military prowess. As India’s 2008-2009 defense White Paper makes clear, “India will engage China to seek greater transparency in its defense policy and posture, while taking all necessary measures to protect the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of India.” As of late, with border disputes flaring and China’s “string of pearls” strategy proceeding apace, it’s no wonder that the implementation of “all necessary measures” appears to be taking precedence over engagement.

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On Wednesday, the Center for Defense Studies hosted an event on the international relief effort in Haiti, with a focus on the U.S. military’s mission there. Haitian Ambassador Raymond Joseph provided keynote remarks, while Robert Perito of USIP and Johanna Mendelson-Forman of CSIS joined Roger Noriega, Tim Sullivan, and Tom Donnelly of AEI for a panel discussion on the state of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, the capabilities of the Haitian National Police, and the scope of the U.S. military’s efforts in the country.

Watch the video from the event HERE.

Last Friday, the United States and the United Nations formalized an agreement with respect to the division of labor among international forces in Haiti. Peacekeepers and police officers from the UN’s MINUSTAH mission, with assistance from the Haitian National Police, will remain in the lead in providing security and keeping order among the Haitian population as the international relief mission proceeds. American forces, meanwhile, will be responsible primarily for securing and repairing critical infrastructure and transport routes. The new security agreement reportedly reflects the terms of the communiqué signed by the U.S. and Haitian government last week.

As the mission in Haiti moves from rescue and emergency relief to recovery and reconstruction, the new security agreement provides some insight as to the scope and likely duration of the U.S. military’s role in the country. Given the extent of the devastation in the wake of the earthquake and the limited infrastructure that existed in Haiti in the first place, the process of repair and development will likely be a lengthy one. (See the SOUTHCOM slides below for engineering updates and an overview of key entry points). The restoration of the capital’s seaport is already underway-with the help of divers and engineers from the USNS Grasp salvage ship-but the effort is not expected to bear significant fruit until mid-February. Assessments by special operations forces of other smaller ports and airfields — like those at Les Cayes, Hinche, and Port Salut — will continue in the days ahead.

Even as the military tackles these tasks, it will no doubt find itself taking on others. Apart from the continuing distribution of aid and medical care, U.S. forces have been assisting in laying the groundwork for an employment program, for instance. And while MINUSTAH forces, under the command of Major General Floriano Peixoto of Brazil, remain ostensibly in the lead in maintaining security — and will soon be receiving reinforcements from Canada, Brazil, and elsewhere — their facilities and equipment were badly damaged in the quake, and there have been varying reports about the extent of their presence and visibility in Port au Prince within the last week. Likewise, the Haitian National Police force lost roughly half of its personnel in the capital. It’s not surprising, then, that the U.S.-UN security agreement allows for American intervention in security situations on the request of the Haitian government.

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