Fighter Jet Deal Stunts U.S.-India Partnership
India’s decision against purchasing an American-made fighter jet in its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition is a big disappointment for those of us who have been high on the potential of a U.S.-India strategic partnership. Had New Delhi decided upon either Boeing’s F/A-18 or Lockheed Martin’s F-16, the selection would have enhanced U.S.-Indian military ties, defense-industrial cooperation, and economic relations as well (the $10 billion deal would have been equal to over half of the value of all 2010 U.S. exports to India).
Instead, as Sadanand so succinctly put it, “India has rebuffed the U.S. offer of a closer strategic partnership.” India, of course, has a long tradition of maintaining a “non-aligned” foreign policy, but this decision strikes me as shortsighted. While Pakistan remains a constant worry, the national security establishment in New Delhi is increasingly worried about China, as well; indeed, over the longer term China almost certainly presents a much greater strategic challenge. And of the participants in the MMRCA competition, only the United States has truly overlapping concerns with India vis-à-vis China.
India’s selection of an American aircraft would have allowed the two countries to enhance their capacity for combined combat operations, which would both serve as a deterrent to future Chinese aggression on the subcontinent or in the Indian Ocean and prepare the militaries to fight alongside one another should deterrence fail. The Rafale and the Eurofighter may be fine planes, but the Europeans aren’t looking to operate jointly with the Indians. Should, God forbid, the Chinese and the Indians ever come to blows, the French will be content to watch from afar. If any country has the interest and the capacity to intervene, it’ll be the United States.
However disappointing this recent news is, it perhaps should not be surprising. Rather, it fits in with a recent pattern. India’s abstention on UNSC Resolution 1973, its disinclination to cooperate on Iran (and its inclination to skirt sanctions), its dallying with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and its attempts to coordinate with the other BRICS members—these are all suggestive of an Indian foreign policy that remains suspicious of America’s preponderant power. Unfortunately for the Indians, that suspicion seems to cloud long-term strategic thought. India has benefited significantly from U.S. efforts to enhance the relationship—see the civil nuclear agreement, for example—but with little to show for it, those efforts are now likely to stall. The Obama and future administrations simply will not be so sanguine about what increasingly looks like a not-so-strategic partnership.
