India’s Afghan Endgame — and What it Means for the U.S.
Not long ago the Washington Post featured a story about a newly constructed park and community center for women in Kabul. Apart from the author’s moving account of the Afghan women’s appreciation for their newfound freedom and opportunities — the center offers a range of vocational classes — one detail stood out: the facility is funded by the Indian government and run by the Ahmedabad-based Self-Employed Women’s Association.
The park is one of many development projects the Indian government has sponsored throughout Afghanistan, having committed $1.3 billion in total to the country’s reconstruction. Major contributions have included power plants, medical facilities, schools, and, most notably, a highway across Nimruz province which links the Afghan ring road to the Iranian border and beyond to Chabahar, an Indian-built port on Iran’s Makran Coast. Delhi’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan has also swelled since 2002, with the opening of consulates in Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif; India maintains a modestly sized — though according to most assessments, influential — embassy in Kabul, as well.
Delhi is pursuing what amounts to a “soft power” campaign in Afghanistan — one which, according to Ahmed Rashid’s Descent Into Chaos, is “designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, give India a high profile with the Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage, and of course undercut Pakistani influence.” And although India’s efforts have without a doubt unnerved the Pakistanis, Delhi has managed avoid the perception among the other states engaged in Afghanistan that it is actively seeking to antagonize Islamabad — perhaps because of the extent of the services it has provided to the Afghan population. Assuming Rashid is right about India’s desire to cultivate influence among the Afghan citizens, its strategy has been success: an ABC News/BBC poll released in early 2009 indicated that 71% of Afghans viewed India favorably. Only 8% said the same of Pakistan.
But in adopting a “hearts and minds” approach, strategically conceived though it may be, the Indians have naturally foreclosed on other modes of influence. As former Indian diplomat Rajiv Sikri noted in his recent book, “Although India’s security remains deeply affected by what happens in Afghanistan, India’s disadvantage is that it is not involved in Afghanistan’s security in any meaningful way.” Among commentators and analysts in India, Sikri isn’t alone in suggesting that Delhi’s efforts to shape events in Afghanistan — while savvy and subtle — remain disproportionate to its strategic interests in the country.
In recent months, however, there have been signs that could quickly change.
In the wake of January’s London conference, during which it was determined that reconciliation with the Taliban would be a central process in Afghanistan’s political future, Delhi has signaled that it is prepared to adopt a more active and assertive stance in defense of its interests in Afghanistan. The announcement of the United States’ intended withdrawal timeline, combined with the realization that any reconciliation process will be subject in large part to Pakistan’s influence among elements of the Taliban, has, it seems, served to sharpen the minds of India’s leaders. Delhi, for instance, has indicated an eagerness to increase its involvement in training the Afghan National Security Forces. And India’s responses to recent attacks on its nationals in Afghanistan — a common occurrence during India’s extensive road-building projects — have been more aggressive than in past incidents, prompting the rapid deployment of additional Indo-Tibetan Border Police commandos. Breaking news that militants involved in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks may have had links to the Afghan Taliban will only increase pressure on India’s leaders to define India’s interests in Afghanistan in terms of security.
Pakistani officials have responded to these developments with predictable bluster, announcing prior to last month’s “strategic dialogue” in Washington their intention of “conveying very clearly” their unhappiness with India’s increasing focus on Afghanistan.
All this has put the United States in a tough spot. According to reports, there’s an ongoing and active debate within the administration about whether to acknowledge and entertain Pakistani attempts to link its continued cooperation in combating the Taliban with the United States’ ability to resolve some of Islamabad’s key frustrations with India — including India’s influence in Afghanistan, the Indian army’s presence along Pakistani border, and, of course, the Kashmir dispute.
U.S. efforts to manage the impact of the India-Pakistan rivalry on the war in Afghanistan are nothing new, of course. It’s been a perennial struggle to persuade Pakistan to commit forces to its western, rather than eastern border, and sever ties with militant groups that have historically served as proxies in its simmering conflict with India. General Stanley McChrystal’s August 2009 strategic assessment outlined the received wisdom on the topic:
“While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.”
According to the Wall Street Journal, the White House sent up a warning flare in December, issuing a secret internal directive which suggested that mounting friction between India and Pakistan was threatening to severely compromise progress in Afghanistan. The directive apparently put the onus on Delhi to defuse the tensions, and concluded that India should not be further involved in supporting the Afghan National Security Forces.
Thus, U.S.-India tensions were running high prior to last week’s Nuclear Security Summit, during which President Obama and Indian officials were scheduled to meet on the sidelines to discuss Afghanistan. Surprisingly, reports indicate that India’s leaders emerged from the talks with a renewed confidence in the United States’ support for their country’s efforts in Afghanistan, having been reassured, apparently, that U.S. cooperation with Pakistan doesn’t come at the expense of its broader strategic partnership with India. One can only hope that’s the case.
In the end, United States can’t expect that India will simply remain on the sidelines as the endgame in Afghanistan takes shape; we have been lucky that India has played such a benign, if not ameliorative role in Afghanistan to date. Pakistan, for its part, must be disabused of the notion that the United States will continue to indulge its insecurities, or allow it to so easily manipulate U.S. relations with a vital partner.
Tim Sullivan is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
