Obama Administration Must Dissuade Pakistan on Nukes
In today’s Wall Street Journal Asia, I write about the implications of Islamabad’s decision to field tactical nuclear weapons. I argue that while such weaponry may enhance Pakistan’s security in the short term by undermining India’s plans for military retaliation (called “Cold Start”) in response to terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan, over the longer term they serve to enhance instability and make violence more likely. In order to counter this new threat, I suggest that New Delhi may devote more resources to missile defense and field its own tactical nukes. I write:
Confident in its missile defenses, India will then be able to retaliate. But because tactical nuclear weapons, which are difficult to counter, will continue to negate the effectiveness of its ground forces—and thus the “Cold Start” option—India will likely need to rely on a wider air campaign aimed at bombing Pakistan into submission. Rather than a shallow incursion into its territory, Pakistan will be faced with air strikes against military targets (perhaps including infrastructure) throughout the country.
Such a campaign will be less effective than “Cold Start”—air campaigns tend to accomplish little on their own—and more escalatory. Assuming the Indian air force achieves air dominance, Pakistan’s military response options will be limited. If the campaign does not quickly achieve the desired result, India, too, will be tempted to at least threaten the use of strategic weapons, confident that its own cities will be effectively defended from nuclear retaliation. In short, nuclear escalation, which India had hoped to avoid with “Cold Start,” suddenly becomes more plausible.
Ironically, then, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons will upset deterrence rather than enhance it. Peace in South Asia becomes ever more elusive.
Unfortunately, the implications here are not limited to South Asia alone. Indeed, Pakistan is quietly making a mockery of international nuclear disarmament efforts. Islamabad’s decision to field tactical nuclear weapons highlights the challenge of achieving global zero. While arms control efforts have for decades focused on American and Russian stockpiles, future such reductions will mean little if others’ armaments continue to grow and if other deterrence relationships continue to destabilize. As I note in the piece, Pakistan’s decision “can only lead to intensified Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition,” with “implications for Sino-Indian nuclear rivalry as well as for other potential nuclear-aspirant countries in the region.”
The Obama administration must take diplomatic action now to dissuade Pakistan from deploying tactical nuclear weapons. Only by doing so can it hope to save its global disarmament drive before it’s barely begun.
(Defense Dept. photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen)
